

psj

~~TOP SECRET~~

Security Information

Official Diary

Wednesday, 3 September 1952

25X1A5a1
25X1A6a

1. At the Deputies' meeting, which the DCI did not attend, reported on the arrangements which we had made for debriefing ██████████ in ██████████

25X1A9a

2. Suggested as a PW measure that PP get out a brochure defining the terms used by the Russians in their various propaganda handouts along the lines suggested by Kennan for a reply to the recent Russian note. ██████████ undertook to look into this question, and Mr. Hedden suggested that after it had been worked out a final brochure should be prepared by professionals.

3. Also reported at the Deputies' meeting that we were setting up a "Who's Who" on the Asian Peace Conference in FI. ██████████

25X1A9a

4. Reported to Mr. Dulles on the NSC Senior Staff meeting on NSC 135, specifically respecting the JCS comments and the NSRB comments. We inferred that the latter may have been affected by the ██████████ paper. 25X1A9a

25X1A9a

25X1A9a

5. Chatted with ██████████, who had been offered to the Intelligence Offices on a rotation basis (two years) by ██████████ ██████████ is highly qualified with respect to Czechoslovakia and well qualified with respect to Eastern Europe, in general. He would be particularly interested in working in O/NE, but would also be interested in other Offices. I suggested that he talk both with Sherman Kent and with Mr. Sheldon.

25X1A9a

25X1A9a

6. Chatted with ██████████ on certain matters coming before USCIB.

7. Attended IADs' meeting.

8. Reviewed with Dr. Andrews his plans respecting the work of the Supergrade Board. His point was that the recent ceiling ruling and the activities of the Board to date are based upon an inadequate study of the actual supergrade position in the various agencies and departments of the Government, and he indicated the need for substantial work being done on the facts. I fully concurred, and also said that he should not lose sight of the allocation of such supergrades as between the Intelligence and Operational Offices. Specifically, it seemed to me that there was an undue allocation of such grades to OPC type operations, which, over the long term, are not basic CIA functions. Dr. Andrews proposed that the facts, when ascertained, be made freely available to the respective ADs, and I concurred.

(CONTINUED)

~~TOP SECRET~~
Security Information

This document is part of an integrated system of records and is not to be released or disseminated outside the system without the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence. It is not to be used for individual systematic review.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Security Information

Official Diary
3 September 1952

25X1A9a

9. Chatted again with [redacted] respecting his reports and received a large volume of reports for dissemination to the Intelligence Offices. [redacted] informed me that he had cleared this in advance with Mr. [redacted].
25X1A9a [redacted]
25X1A9a [redacted]

25X1A9a

10. [redacted] requested some tailor-made intelligence reports, which I shall refer to as [redacted]. I later confirmed with the Director that this series had his approval and thereafter requested [redacted] to prepare such a series. [redacted] is the only person other than the DCI, D/DCI and [redacted] who is informed as to the nature of this series.
25X1A2g [redacted]
25X1A9a [redacted]
25X1A9a [redacted]
25X1A9a [redacted]
25X1A9a [redacted]

25X1A6c

25X1A9a

11. Spoke with Dr. Kent on [redacted] from [redacted] respecting a proposed Anglo-French-US conference on the Soviet threat to NATO. Dr. Kent and I agreed as to the line to be taken and I undertook to draft a reply.

12. Commented to Dr. Kent with respect to the North African estimate, stating that I was surprised that no mention was made to the U.S. labor support to the various Nationalist movements. Also queried whether the estimate fully took into account the possibility of small-scale riots in Morocco during the fall. Dr. Kent took this point under consideration.

13. Col. Porter phoned me respecting the Joint Staff reaction to the first two conclusions of NIE 64. In those paragraphs the Russians had been given the capability of taking most of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, but not simultaneously. The Joint Staff thought that this was most "plus" and also felt that the operations could be conducted simultaneously. I expressed some surprise at this, in view of the fact that last year, during the preparation of NSC 114, after an NIE had given the Soviets the capability of taking all of Europe, the JCS had insisted on revising NSC 114 to indicate that certain strategically-important positions could be held. Their present attitude indicated either that they were changing their position or that we were slipping vis-a-vis the Soviets. Col. Porter was not, apparently, familiar with this background and undertook to look into it. I later informed [redacted] of O/NE of these facts and requested him to look into the history of NSC 114. Subsequently, I confirmed with Mr. Lay my recollection of the facts.
25X1A9a

~~TOP SECRET~~

Security Information